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With a simple click on your favorite online marketplace, any 
consumer can unknowingly buy counterfeit goods. Counterfeits are 
no longer limited to fake luxury bags on the streets of Chinatown. 
These dupes can be roller skates, children’s toys, and even car tires. 
However, counterfeit products’ impact reaches far beyond just con-
sumer health and safety. Counterfeiting negatively affects small 
businesses, imposes financial burdens, and causes reputational 
damage. Online marketplaces are aware of the increase of counter-
feit products on their websites. Yet, they continue to facilitate its 
growth because it is unlikely the online platforms will be held liable 
for the sale of counterfeit goods. Left with very little options, 
rightsholders often suffer and consumers are unaware of the dan-
gers. In light of these growing concerns, Congress recognizes the 
need for anti-counterfeiting legislation. Expanding contributory 
trademark liability could be the most effective way to address this 
need, but representatives have left anti-counterfeiting law 
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vulnerable. This Note addresses the tension between rightsholders 
and online marketplaces and proposes regulatory solutions to pro-
vide more guidance for anti-counterfeiting legislation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Mindy McCarthy—owner of the Etsy store MinMac—
started her jewelry company to generate income while raising her 
children.1 She focused on her packaging and relied on positive re-
views when potential customers considered buying from her store.2 
After having success, she found counterfeiters using her product 
photos, shrinking the images to fit their pendants and selling them 
on online marketplaces, such as Amazon, eBay, and Wish.com.3 The 
designs were blurry and sold for significantly less than what it cost 
for Mindy to make.4 Filing hundreds of infringement notices, 
Wish.com blocked her requests and Amazon eventually denied her 
notices as well.5 By 2018, only making one-quarter of her annual 
 
1 Oleksandra Zavertailo, Interview: The Impact of Counterfeiting on a Growing Etsy 
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revenue, Mindy was in a financial hole and decided to step away 
from her business.6 This struggle with online marketplaces is just 
one example of how counterfeits affect rightsholders. 
Counterfeits are seemingly everywhere. Once limited to street 
dealers in Chinatown, these dupes are now readily available on 
online marketplaces like Amazon and eBay. Because online market-
places are often unresponsive to rightsholders’ notices and mainly 
communicate automated responses,7 there have been rising tensions 
between brands and these online platforms.8 Further, online market-
places require rightsholders to find proof of counterfeit sales and to 
provide the seller’s identity, which is usually information only the 
marketplace can access.9 Rightsholders, feeling helpless to the pro-
cess, often want to sue the platforms for their lack of activity against 
counterfeits, but going against these online giants is risky.10 
Other rightsholders have had their fair share of poor interactions 
with online marketplaces as well. Kevin Williams and Glenn 
Archer—owners of Brush Hero—went from receiving an average of 
four-star reviews for their car detailing brush on Amazon to one-star 
reviews due to counterfeit sales.11 The counterfeits looked like the 
real product, which is made in Utah, but the returns had the “Made 
in China” label.12 Williams described the situation as “the worst pos-
sible scenario,” reporting infringing sellers as many as five times.13 
A similar situation occurred for Jon Fawcett’s Fuse Chicken, a 
smartphone accessories company. Upon asking his account repre-
sentative to restrict other sellers’ ability to list his products, Amazon 
replied that the restriction was for companies who spend millions in 
 
6 Id. 
7 Jeff Bercovici, Small Businesses Say Amazon Has a Huge Counterfeiting Problem. 
This ‘Shark Tank’ Company Is Fighting Back, INC. (Mar./Apr. 2019), 
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201904/jeff-bercovici/amazon-fake-copycat-knockoff-
products-small-business.html [https://perma.cc/58MT-TYBS]. 






1306 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:1302 
 
advertising.14 Without success in combating counterfeit products, 
Fawcett filed a lawsuit against Amazon.15 
As Mindy’s case and others demonstrate, the road to tackling 
counterfeits has become tumultuous, and problems in current law 
are the heart of the issue. Bringing a lawsuit against individual 
sellers is costly, but it is also difficult as counterfeit sellers are often 
located outside of U.S. jurisdiction.16 Additionally, current laws al-
low online marketplaces to generally avoid liability for the sale of 
counterfeit goods. The dominant rule comes from the Second Cir-
cuit, which held that an online marketplace is not liable for contrib-
utory trademark infringement unless the platform has more than 
general knowledge that the sales of counterfeit items are afoot.17 
Although online marketplaces argue they take counterfeit sales 
seriously by implementing anti-fraud measures,18 as a result of cur-
rent law, these platforms have very little incentive to bear the re-
sponsibility of vetting counterfeit sellers and products.19 Courts do 
not want to impose liability on online marketplaces because some 
legitimate products are sold on the platforms, and eliminating the 
sale of all resold goods would diminish competition for genuine 
merchandise.20 However, many rightsholders want an adequate re-
sponse to the growing problem.21 
The tug of war between rightsholders and online marketplaces 
has heightened, calling on legislators to take a closer look at the 
 
14 Id. 
15 See Fuse Chicken LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 5:17CV1538, 2018 WL 2766163 
(N.D. Ohio June 8, 2018). 
16 Marcella Ballard & Maria R. Sinatra, Shop Safe Act 2020: A New Tool for Brand 
Owners in the Fight Against Online Counterfeits?, VENABLE (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2020/05/shop-safe-act-2020-a-new-tool 
[https://perma.cc/Q3EE-YLPA]. 
17 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
18 Id. at 100. 
19 See James Bikoff, Shop Safe Act: A Bill to Hold E-Commerce Sites Liable for 
Counterfeit Goods Sold Online, SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP, 
https://www.sgrlaw.com/ttl-articles/shop-safe-act-a-bill-to-hold-e-commerce-sites-liable-
for-counterfeit-goods-sold-online [https://perma.cc/B43Y-AL4Q]. 
20 Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 98.  
21 See generally Bercovici, supra note 7. 
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counterfeit problem.22 In combating the problem, a bipartisan group 
of House Representatives proposed a bill, the “Stopping Harmful 
Offers on Platforms by Screening Against Fakes in E-Commerce 
Act of 2020,” better known as the SHOP SAFE Act, amending the 
Lanham Act to address contributory trademark infringement.23 The 
SHOP SAFE Act was one of three bi-partisan bills introduced to 
address the growth of counterfeit products on online platforms,24 
signaling a significant bi-partisan concern. Due to a new Congress, 
the bills were archived. Though the bill is inefficient for rightshold-
ers and leaves very little recourse available,25 the SHOP SAFE Act 
was a noteworthy proposal in addressing contributory trademark li-
ability.  
New anti-counterfeiting legislation has the potential to miss the 
mark in settling the consequences of current laws. In considering the 
remediation of current laws’ effects, foreign and copyright law il-
lustrate legislative pitfalls, expressing the need for improvements to 
anti-counterfeiting legislation.26 This Note explores the counterfeit 
problem, the impact and drawbacks with current law, and how leg-
islation such as the SHOP SAFE Act does not protect against all 
counterfeiting.27 Part I describes the key drivers of counterfeiting 
 
22 See infra Section I.A.2; see also Press Release, AAFA, AAFA Calls for Legislation 




23 See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
24 See S. 3073, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019), available at https://www.congress.gov/ 
116/bills/s3073/BILLS-116s3073is.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ87-CENU]; see also S. 3431, 
116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), available at https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/ 
s3431/BILLS-116s3431is.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XBM-WG9D]. Although both bills 
mention online marketplaces, the SHOP SAFE Act is of significant importance because it 
explicitly addresses contributory trademark liability. 
25 See infra Section III.A. 
26 See infra Sections II.C, II.D. 
27 The SHOP SAFE Act has been archived due to a new Congress. However, because 
two of the House Representatives remain in the House, it is likely this bill or a similar bill 
will at least be introduced. Legislation to combat counterfeits on online marketplaces is of 
interest to Congress and the proposals in this Note would apply if members of Congress 
decide to introduce a bill to address contributory liability of online marketplaces under the 
Lanham Act. 
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and its harms, how online marketplaces play a role, and current laws 
surrounding liability of online marketplaces. Part II explains the 
growing complications with current law, the tension between brands 
and online marketplaces resulting from current law, and compara-
tive findings in copyright and foreign law. Part III describes the 
SHOP SAFE Act’s implications for rightsholders and proposes so-
lutions to amend the bill based on both foreign and copyright law. 
 
I. HOUSE OF MIRRORS: THE COUNTERFEIT PROBLEM 
The counterfeit problem stems from the increase of fake items 
on the Internet and the inadequacy of measures taken by online mar-
ketplaces. Thus, the problem leads to a dangerous game of whack-
a-mole with hardly any end in sight. To understand how serious the 
problem is, one must understand the key background information 
surrounding counterfeits, online marketplaces, and current laws. 
Section I.A provides an overview of counterfeiting and online mar-
ketplaces, including defining what counterfeiting is and its key driv-
ers. Section I.A also explains how counterfeiting contributes to 
health and safety concerns, financial and reputational harm, dimin-
ishment of innovation and investments, and organized crime. Sec-
tion I.B presents an overview of the purpose of the Lanham Act, 
which governs trademark law, and details direct trademark infringe-
ment and contributory trademark liability. Lastly, Section I.C ex-
plains current domestic laws surrounding contributory trademark li-
ability of online marketplaces, focusing on the Second Circuit’s de-
cision, which has a significant impact on liability of online market-
places. 
A. How Online Platforms Enable Counterfeiting 
Counterfeiting is the use of a mark that is identical to a registered 
mark,28 and involves “the manufacturing or distribution of goods 
under someone else’s name, and without their permission.”29 Coun-
terfeit goods are typically of low quality30 and defraud purchasers 
 
28 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
29 What is Counterfeiting?, INT’L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COAL., https://www.iacc.org/ 
resources/about/what-is-counterfeiting [https://perma.cc/ZPF2-JCE2]. 
30 See id. 
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who pay for the brand name’s standard.31 They often come from 
foreign markets; for example, the U.S. has cracked down on China 
for the influx of counterfeit goods coming into the country.32 A typ-
ical example of a counterfeit is a fake Louis Vuitton bag sold as the 
real thing.33 However, many counterfeit products produced include 
refrigerator testing instruments,34 unsafe cribs,35 and bicycles.36 Alt-
hough counterfeiting is a federal and state crime,37 counterfeit goods 
have become a profitable activity due to the rise of the Internet and 
online shopping.38 While the expansion of the Internet has led to the 
 
31 United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990). 
32 Alan Rappeport, U.S. Cracks Down on Counterfeits in a Warning Shot to China, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/us/politics/us-cracks-down-
on-counterfeits-in-a-warning-shot-to-china.html [https://perma.cc/W8QX-6NUJ]. 
33 See generally Trace William Cowen, Louis Vuitton Busts Up Massive Fake Bags 
Operation in China, COMPLEX (Sept. 03, 2020), https://www.complex.com/style/ 
2020/09/louis-vuitton-busts-fake-bags-operation-in-china [https://perma.cc/WL46-7S5L]. 
34 See Product Counterfeiting: How Fakes Are Undermining U.S. Jobs, Innovation, and 
Consumer Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the 
H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 109th Cong. 24 (June 25, 2005) (testimony of David S. 
Pearl, II, Executive Vice President, Uniweld Products, Inc.), available at 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=469799 [https://perma.cc/6FMK-LPES] [hereinafter 
Product Counterfeiting]. 
35 See Buyer Beware: Fake and Unsafe Products on Online Marketplaces: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Com. of the Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th 
Cong. 5 (Mar. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Buyer Beware] (statement of Lori Wallach, Director, 
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch), available at https://docs.house.gov/ 
meetings/IF/IF17/20200304/110634/HHRG-116-IF17-Wstate-WallachL-20200304.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DHA3-NB3P]. 
36 See id. at 2 (statement of Andrew Love, Head of Brand Security/Investigations/Global 
Enforcement, Specialized Bicycles), available at https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/03.04.30%20Written%20Testimo
ny_Love.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7RZ-5XA4]). 
37 United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating “Congress enacted 
section 2320 in response to an increasing tide of commercial trademark counterfeiting and 
wished to impose stiff criminal penalties upon those whose intentional acts were previously 
subject only to civil sanctions under the Lanham Act.”); What is Counterfeiting?, supra 
note 29.  
38 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT AND 
PIRATED GOODS 8, 10 (2020), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/20_0124_plcy_counterfeit-pirated-goods-report_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BQ69-6UGJ]. Approximately “$1.7 trillion and $4.5 trillion a year” is 
attributed to domestic and international sales of counterfeit and pirated goods. LIBR. OF 
CONG., U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COUNTERFEIT GOODS—LANDSCAPE REVIEW OF 
EXISTING/EMERGING RESEARCH (2020), available at 
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creation of many websites such as Amazon and eBay, the conse-
quences include the ease in which counterfeiters prey on consumers 
by allowing imitations to blend in with legitimate businesses.39 
1. Key Drivers of Online Counterfeiting 
The counterfeiting industry thrives for a multitude of reasons. 
First, consumers desire low prices.40 Some proponents argue for 
lowering costs by promoting more competition to give consumers 
more choices.41 This argument is flawed. For example, high-priced 
items are typically European exports subjected to duties, and the ma-
terials needed to produce these items are costly.42 Second, online 
marketplaces make startup and production costs relatively attainable 
for counterfeit e-commerce.43 The startup expenses are fixed and the 
costs of maintaining the web business are lower than normal busi-
ness operations.44 Counterfeiters can set up their “stores” with little 
to no specialized technological skills or sophistication, and there is 
no need to pay for retail space or hire in-person employees.45 Online 
marketplaces also allow counterfeiters to easily continue their busi-
ness considering once the platform shuts down their storefronts, they 
can quickly and easily set up new stores.46 
Third, counterfeiters enhance profitability by keeping produc-
tion costs low, most commonly by stealing product secrets.47 For 




39 See Buyer Beware, supra note 35, at 7 (statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public 
Citizen’s Global Trade Watch). 
40 See What is Counterfeiting?, supra note 29. 
41 See Buyer Beware, supra note 35, at 9 (statement of David Friedman, Vice President, 
Advocacy Consumer Reports), available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/ 
IF17/20200304/110634/HHRG-116-IF17-Wstate-FriedmanD-20200304.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/HG6J-LPK4]. 
42 See Josh Partner, The High Price of Fashion, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 3, 2006), 
https://nymag.com/fashion/06/spring/15735/index1.html [https://perma.cc/3ERT-XU66]. 
43 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 12. Production costs are low, 
transactions are convenient, and there is “an air of legitimacy.” Id. at 8. 
44 See id. at 12. 
45 See id. 
46 See Ballard & Sinatra, supra note 16. 
47 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 12. 
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then create the counterfeit goods from that information.48 In other 
cases, employees will sell unreleased products.49 Counterfeiters will 
also use intermediaries to steal products or technology, which “re-
duces the traceability to the counterfeiter.”50 Additionally, counter-
feiters reduce production costs by manufacturing the goods in for-
eign markets, where producing the good is cheaper due to unsafe 
working conditions and low quality materials.51 This method also 
lowers the chance of detecting the counterfeiter and minimizes legal 
liability.52 
Fourth, counterfeiters enjoy lower marketing costs.53 Because of 
the Internet’s anonymity, they can easily retarget and remarket to 
consumers through advertising using legitimate images and descrip-
tions.54 This use of the Internet confuses consumers into thinking 
they are purchasing the real product.55 For example, by using 
hashtags on social media, users can search, unknowingly find, and 
purchase counterfeit products comingled with legitimate products, 
making it difficult for users to differentiate.56 
Lastly, distribution costs are lower.57 Counterfeiters previously 
used international air transport—because of the high volume of 
products shipped, enforcement was more difficult.58 However, cur-
rent trends suggest counterfeit products are sent in smaller packages 
via mail or express courier operators to minimize detection and loss 
 
48 Id. 
49 For example, a sales representative at the Louis Vuitton Guangzhou store sold 
unreleased bags to counterfeit makers at an upmarket price in order to facilitate the spread 
of counterfeit bags when the real bags would be released. See Cowen, supra note 33. 
50 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 12. 
51 Id. at 12–13.  
52 Id. at 12. 
53 Id. at 13. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id.; see, e.g., Olivia Solon and David Ingram, Scammers Have Turned Instagram into 
a Showroom for Luxury Counterfeits, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/scammers-have-turned-instagram-showroom-
luxury-counterfeits-n997256 [https://perma.cc/5ZNQ-DHZN]. 
57 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 13. 
58 Id. at 14. 
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to the counterfeiter.59 Instead of shipping by plane directly to con-
sumers, counterfeiters may send products to third-parties—also 
known as drop shippers—through non-private express courier ser-
vices.60 Counterfeiters may also use false customs declarations and 
shipping manifests to conceal products, and mix counterfeit goods 
with legitimate items to minimize detection.61 Because there are 
lower distribution costs, counterfeiters enjoy “greater convenience 
in executing transactions” and an “air of legitimacy” by listing on 
popular online platforms.62 
2. How Counterfeit Goods Wreak Havoc 
Counterfeit products raise serious consumer health and safety 
concerns as they are almost always manufactured in substandard 
conditions.63 Often, the make-up of the counterfeit products is un-
known and untraceable,64 and the labs that manufacture these items 
have no oversight.65 For example, potential hidden toxins are in jer-
seys, jewelry, purses, and children’s toys.66 Further, during the 
 
59 INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERMEDIARIES: FIGHTING 
COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 32 (2015), 
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2015/03/ICC-BASCAP-Roles-and-
Responsibilities-of-Intermediaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM84-2DWV]. 
60 Id. For example, the counterfeit product may originate in an Eastern European country 
and the manufacturer may send it to the drop shipper via express mail service. See id. The 
drop shipper will act as a distributor and send the product directly to the consumer. See id. 
61 OFF. OF THE INTELL. PROP. ENF’T COORDINATOR EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S. 
JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, SUPPORTING 
INNOVATION, CREATIVITY & ENTERPRISE CHARTING A PATH AHEAD 29 (2017–2019), 
available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ 
spotlight/eop_ipec_jointstrategicplan_hi-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4S-HAV8] 
[hereinafter JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELL. PROP.]. For example, small counterfeit 
products have been concealed in air-conditioning equipment or sports balls. Id.  
62 See Megan Corrigan et al., US Government Cracks Down on Counterfeits in 2020, 
BAKER HOSTETLER (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2020/03/18/us-
government-cracks-down-on-counterfeits-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/GML5-A5DU]. 
63 See Counterfeits and Their Impact on Consumer Health and Safety: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 (2d Sess. 2016) (testimony of Shelley 
Duggan, Global Brand Protection Program Leader, The Procter & Gamble Company), 
available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-27-16%20Duggan% 
20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6GF-F5YL]. 
64 Id. at 2. 
65 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 17. 
66 Id. at 16–18. Counterfeit cosmetics may also contain “arsenic, mercury, aluminum, or 
lead.” Id. at 18. 
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coronavirus pandemic, there were fraudulent COVID-19 tests and 
faulty facial coverings.67 
Health and safety are not the only dangers. Counterfeits also 
threaten economic harm.68 Frontier Economics, an economics con-
sultancy, conducted a study finding this “underground economy” 
creates a serious burden on the global economy.69 The study ex-
plained counterfeits deprive governmental revenues of public ser-
vices, places burdens on taxpayers, and contributes to unemploy-
ment.70 In 2013, approximately 2 to 2.6 million jobs were lost glob-
ally due to counterfeit goods, with job displacement expected to 
double by 2022.71 
Counterfeits also hurt the value of legitimate brands, leading to 
diminished innovation and a lack of investment in the creation of 
innovative products.72 For example, when rightsholders cannot re-
ceive a price premium for their goods, they are less likely to invest 
in creating products.73 Mindy’s story74 demonstrates how inventors 
are less likely to invent as they cannot produce products at counter-
feit prices.75 Additionally, smaller businesses often lack the exper-
tise or resources to find and police the fakes, especially in global 
markets.76 Small companies particularly suffer because they cannot 
invest in continuous monitoring, performing test buys, and sending 
takedown notices like larger corporations.77 
 
67 See Amy Newhouse, COVID-19 and Counterfeiting Go Hand-in-Hand, THE HILL 
(July 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/509230-covid-19-and-
counterfeiting-go-hand-in-hand [https://perma.cc/23BQ-URLD]. 
68 See id. 
69 FRONTIER ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 5 
(2016), https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/ICC-BASCAP-Frontier-
report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FYV-9ERM]. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. at 8.  
72 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 19. 
73 Id. 
74 See supra Introduction. 
75 See Zavertailo, supra note 1. 
76 Daniel Costello, Global Expansion Brings Counterfeit Risks, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 
2007), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-may-22-fi-smallchina22-
story.html [https://perma.cc/A9SG-N6D5]; Product Counterfeiting, supra note 34, at 3 
(statement of Hon. Cliff Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. On Com., Trade, and Consumer 
Prot.) (stating that U.S. small companies are “feeling the brunt of this global problem”). 
77 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 19.  
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Moreover, criminal organizations are notable perpetrators of 
selling counterfeit goods on online marketplaces.78 These organiza-
tions may use the revenue from counterfeit sales for other criminal 
activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and terror-
ism.79 In distributing counterfeit products, these organizations rely 
on manipulating trade routes, usually passing through jurisdictions 
with little risk of intellectual property enforcement actions.80 Addi-
tionally, counterfeiters infiltrate private supply chains of legitimate 
companies, aiding the unknowing sale of fraudulent products to con-
sumers, industries, and governments.81 For example, an INTERPOL 
supported operation found fraudulent medicines in private supply 
chains donated to Ugandan and Kenyan governments for hospital 
use.82 
Counterfeit listings also pose serious reputational harm to legit-
imate businesses, especially on social media.83 Social media algo-
rithms may trick consumers into thinking a counterfeit item is gen-
uine.84 For example, a consumer may search for a certain product 
online. Later the user may see an advertisement on a social media 
site for the exact product they were seeking. However, instead of a 
legitimate brand, the item is a counterfeit and the consumer may 
then unknowingly purchase it. When consumers receive fake prod-
ucts and are disappointed in the quality, they will direct their frus-
trations to the authentic brand owner.85 As a result, customers may 
spread bad word of mouth reviews or leave negative comments 
 
78 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 61, at 42. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 28. 
81 Id. at 42. 
82 East African Countries Crack Down on Counterfeiters in INTERPOL/IMPACT-




83 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORGANIZATION, STUDY ON APPROACHES TO ONLINE 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENTS 4–5 (2017), available at https://www.wipo.int/ 
edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_12/wipo_ace_12_9_rev_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3SA3-YRRM]. 
84 Id. at 5. 
85 Peter S. Sloane et al., Trademark Vigilance in the Twenty-First Century: An Update, 
30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1206 (2020). 
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online,86 similar to what happened with Brush Hero and Fuse 
Chicken.87 
B. Online Platform Liability for Counterfeits 
The Lanham Act governs trademark protections in the U.S. and 
defines trademarks as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof.”88 One of its original purposes was to prevent 
fraud and deception by use of reproductions, copies, or counterfeits 
of registered marks in commerce.89 It also sought to provide rights 
and remedies respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair com-
petition.90 The Lanham Act has defined counterfeit as, “a spurious 
mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable 
from, a registered mark.”91 To prove direct infringement for coun-
terfeit trademarks under § 1114 of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant used the mark in commerce without consent 
and that such use is likely to cause confusion.92 Courts will typically 
apply these elements in a two-prong test to see if the statute protects 
the mark and whether it causes confusion to a consumer.93 
Conversely, contributory trademark infringement derives from 
the common law of torts.94 A contributory trademark infringement 
claim can reach beyond those who mislabel goods with the mark of 
another to hold additional parties accountable.95 In other words, 
even if a party does not directly participate in the infringement, they 
may nevertheless be responsible for another party’s infringing ac-
tivities.96 In 1982, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test for 
 
86 Id. 
87 See supra Introduction. 
88 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
89 H.R. 1654, 79th Cong. 427, 444 (1946). The full bill was titled “An Act to provide 
for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the 
provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes.” Id. 
90 Id.  
91 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
92 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
93 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010). 
94 Id. at 103–04 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913, 930 (2005)). 
95 Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982). 
96 Id. 
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contributory trademark infringement,97 commonly known as the In-
wood test. To satisfy the test, the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant intentionally induced another to infringe on a trademark or 
that the defendant continued to supply products to one whom they 
know or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringe-
ment.98 Although this test originally applied to manufacturers or dis-
tributors for contributory liability, the Second Circuit extended the 
test to apply to cases involving online marketplaces.99 
For contributory trademark infringement claims, plaintiffs may 
argue that the defendant engaged in willful blindness to satisfy the 
knowledge requirement.100 Willful blindness is when a defendant 
knew it may be selling infringing goods, but intentionally failed to 
investigate.101 However, courts reason that if an online marketplace 
intentionally shielded itself from discovering infringing sellers or 
listings, willful blindness may be sufficient to trigger Inwood’s 
knowledge standard.102 
Some proponents suggest bringing counterfeit suits under copy-
right law, arguing the use of unauthorized photographs may provide 
rightsholders an alternative avenue.103 However, this argument does 
not address the inherent injustice in using a legitimate brand’s name 
to sell counterfeit goods. Alternatively, there may be an argument 
that injured parties should bring patent claims for counterfeit goods. 
However, “patent infringement does not cause the kind of unquan-
tifiable harm to goodwill or reputation that the Lanham Act is in-
tended to address.”104 Thus, if brands want to protect their name 
from counterfeiting, trademark law is a good option.  
 
97 See id. at 854. 
98 Id. 
99 Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 104–106. 
100 See id. at 109. 
101 Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Ultimate One Distrib. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 3d 137, 164 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Fendi Adele, S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 
26, 31 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
102 Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 109. 
103 Sloane, supra note 85, at 1229.  
104 Hearing on Counterfeits and Cluttering: Emerging Threats to the Integrity of the 
Trademark System and the Impact on American Consumers and Businesses: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 6 (2019) (statement of Peter M. Brody, Partner, Ropes & Gray 
LLP). 
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C. The Difficulty in Holding Online Marketplaces Liable Under 
Current Law 
1. The Tiffany v. eBay Ruling 
In 2010, the Second Circuit changed the landscape regarding 
trademark liability of online marketplaces.105 Tiffany, the plaintiff, 
put forth three main arguments for trademark infringement: eBay 
was directly liable, contributorily liable, and willfully blind.106 The 
court decided that online marketplaces are not liable for direct trade-
mark infringement, ruling that online marketplaces can use a brand’s 
mark to describe authentic products.107 The court also held that In-
wood’s knowledge requirement determines whether an online mar-
ketplace can be held liable for contributory trademark liability.108 
Lastly, the court addressed willful blindness. The court noted that if 
an online marketplace did not ignore information regarding counter-
feit sales, they are not willfully blind and such “knowledge is insuf-
ficient to trigger liability under Inwood.”109 
In Tiffany, the luxury jewelry maker Tiffany—commonly 
known as Tiffany & Co.—conducted two surveys known as “Buy-
ing Programs.”110 As a part of these programs, Tiffany bought vari-
ous items on eBay to determine how many were authentic and coun-
terfeit.111 In the first survey, Tiffany found 73.1 percent were coun-
terfeit and in the second survey 75.5 percent were counterfeit.112 At 
the time, eBay had its VeRO program which would remove listings 
of reported goods within twenty-four hours of receiving a “Notice 
Of Claimed Infringement form or NOCI form.”113 If the auction was 
still in progress, eBay would remove the listing and inform the 
seller.114 If the auction already ended, eBay would cancel the 
 
105 See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d 93. 
106 Id. at 101, 103, 110; Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 49, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay 
Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv). 
107 Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 103. 
108 See id. at 106. 
109 See id. at 110. 
110 Id. at 97. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 99. 
114 Id. 
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transaction or reimburse the buyer.115 For Tiffany, eBay removed 
“seventy to eighty percent of counterfeit listings within twelve hours 
of notification.”116 eBay also allowed Tiffany, and other rightshold-
ers, to create buyer beware pages to inform users.117 By late 2006, 
eBay implemented more anti-counterfeit measures by delaying list-
ings including brand names so rightsholders could review them.118 
a) Direct Trademark Liability 
While attempting to restrict counterfeit listings, eBay also 
sought to promote the sale of luxury goods by advertising the avail-
ability of Tiffany products on its website and by purchasing spon-
sored-link advertisements on various search engines.119 Tiffany ar-
gued eBay directly infringed its mark in two ways: by using the 
mark on eBay’s website and purchasing sponsored links using the 
mark on search engines.120 Tiffany also argued eBay and its sellers 
were jointly and severally liable.121 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
applied the two-prong test to determine direct trademark liability: 
(1) “whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled to protection”; and (2) 
“whether the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consum-
ers confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s 
goods.”122 
The Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that eBay’s use 
of Tiffany’s trademark was lawful because eBay used that mark to 
describe authentic Tiffany jewelry, citing the nominative fair use 
defense.123 This defense provides that a defendant can use the plain-
tiff’s mark to identify the plaintiff’s goods as long as it does not 
create a likelihood of confusion about the source or sponsorship.124 
The court stated that reducing or eliminating the sale of second-hand 




117 Id. at 99–100. 
118 Id. at 100. 
119 Id. at 100–01. 
120 Id. at 102. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 102–03. 
124 Id. at 102. 
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Tiffany.125 The court also noted that the result would be a loss of 
revenue to eBay.126 Tiffany argued that even though eBay may have 
used the mark to describe genuine Tiffany products, eBay knew or 
should have known there was a notable counterfeit problem.127 The 
Second Circuit decided this argument did not apply to direct trade-
mark infringement but instead applied to whether eBay could be 
held liable for contributory trademark infringement.128 The court 
also reasoned eBay could not guarantee the genuineness of all Tif-
fany products on its website.129 
b) Contributory Trademark Liability 
On the issue of contributory trademark infringement, Tiffany ar-
gued again that eBay knew, or at least had reason to know, counter-
feit Tiffany goods were sold on the platform because of the NOCI 
forms, the demand letters, and the buying programs’ results Tiffany 
sent to eBay.130 The Second Circuit applied Inwood’s knowledge 
requirement for contributory trademark liability and agreed with the 
lower court’s decision that this generalized knowledge was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the Inwood test.131 In applying Inwood, the court con-
cluded there must be more than general knowledge or a reason to 
know counterfeit goods were sold to hold the online marketplace 
liable for contributory trademark infringement.132 Specifically, the 
Second Circuit agreed with the District Court that Tiffany would 
need to show “eBay knew or had reason to know of specific in-
stances of actual infringement.”133 Therefore, the court ruled eBay 
was not contributorily liable for trademark infringement.134 
 
125 Id. at 98. 
126 Id. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 103, 107. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 106. 
131 Id. at 107. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 109. 
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c) Willful Blindness 
On the willful blindness issue, the Second Circuit agreed with 
the District Court that if eBay knew of the counterfeits and inten-
tionally shielded itself from discovering the listings and the sellers 
behind the listings, this inaction may have satisfied Inwood’s 
knowledge requirement.135 However, despite eBay having general 
knowledge that counterfeit Tiffany products were sold, the court 
ruled this knowledge was insufficient to trigger Inwood.136 The court 
reasoned eBay did not ignore the information about counterfeit 
products on its website as eBay removed many of the reported list-
ings.137 
2. Life After Tiffany: How Courts Keep This Ruling Alive 
Other courts agree that Tiffany is the standard for contributory 
trademark liability of online marketplaces, yet they often distinguish 
cases from Tiffany.138 In the Eleventh Circuit, the court ruled in fa-
vor of the luxury brand retailer, Luxottica, by upholding the jury’s 
verdict that defendant, Airport Mini Mall, was liable for contribu-
tory trademark infringement.139 The court distinguished itself from 
Tiffany by ruling there was a landlord-tenant relationship.140 While 
the defendant served as the Mall’s landlord, law enforcement raided 
the shopping center and confiscated counterfeit Luxottica products 
three times.141 Reasoning that a landlord-tenant relationship is dif-
ferent from Tiffany’s relationship with eBay, the defendants did not 
need Luxottica’s help in identifying the subtenants who were in-
fringing on Luxottica’s mark.142 
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 110. 
137 Id. at 99, 110. 
138 Although this Note focuses on contributory trademark liability, online marketplaces 
have been held strictly liable for third party sellers in products liability cases. See Bolger 
v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020). 
139 Luxottica Grp., v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC, 932 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019). 
140 Id. at 1313, 1314–15. 
141 Id. at 1309. 
142 Id. at 1314–15. 
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Similarly, in a California case, Tre Milano v. Amazon, Tiffany 
still prevailed.143 The court ruled that Tre Milano failed to demon-
strate a likelihood of prevailing on direct and contributory infringe-
ment claims against Amazon because the online marketplace re-
moved the infringing listings and was not willfully blind.144 In an-
other case, a Southern District of New York court ruled in favor of 
Chanel, a luxury retailer, by holding The RealReal, a luxury con-
signment, liable for direct trademark infringement of counterfeit 
Chanel items.145 The court distinguished this case from Tiffany be-
cause unlike eBay, The RealReal has the sole responsibility of sell-
ing the goods.146  In this case, the ruling suggests luxury consigners 
do not function as online marketplaces, thus, Tiffany and the coun-
terfeit problem lives on. 
 
II. MORE COUNTERFEITS, MORE PROBLEMS: THE PROBLEM WITH ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING LEGISLATION 
     Owners of legitimate trademarks are plagued by the multitude 
of counterfeit goods available on the Internet,147 and given that 
online counterfeiters can charge far less than their originals, brands 
have very little recourse available. While current law suggests a 
need for legislative intervention, proposed legislation does not alle-
viate the significant burdens on rightsholders.148 Section II.A de-
scribes the problem with the Tiffany ruling and Section II.B details 
the inadequacy of online marketplaces’ internal regulating systems. 
Although this Note discusses the distorted tango between contribu-
tory trademark infringement, online marketplaces, and counterfeits, 
similar negative impacts arise in copyright law. Thus, Section II.C 
examines the results and legal implications of copyright law as com-
pared to trademark law. Section II.D introduces French and Italian 
law to highlight the deficiencies in holding online marketplaces lia-
ble in the U.S. Lastly, Section II.E introduces the SHOP SAFE Act. 
 
143 Tre Milano, LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc., No. B234753, 2012 WL 3594380, at *14 
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012). 
144 Id. 
145 Chanel, Inc. v. RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 430, 441–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
146 Id. at 441. 
147 United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990). 
148 See infra Section II.A. and Section III.A. 
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A. The Negative Impacts of Tiffany 
In Tiffany, there were concerns about who should be responsible 
for finding counterfeits.149 Tiffany argued if eBay were not held li-
able, the ruling would require rightsholders to police online market-
places “24 hours a day, and 365 days a year,” and many rightshold-
ers would be unable to bear this burden.150 Rightsholders have, in 
fact, encountered several hurdles after the Tiffany ruling. In holding 
online sellers accountable, existing laws tend to shield foreign coun-
terfeiters from liability because they are often outside of U.S. juris-
diction.151 Thus, rightsholders often turn to either continuously tak-
ing down listings or suing for trademark infringement.152 Ulti-
mately, the burden is on rightsholders to police and report infringe-
ment,153 creating financial and time-consuming costs. 
The time-consuming burdens on rightsholders are significant. 
The Tiffany decision, arguably, shifted the burden away from the e-
commerce platform and placed it onto the rightsholder to find and 
police counterfeits,154 engaging in a continuous game of whack-a-
mole.155 For example, Wish.com blocked infringement requests by 
legitimate owners against sellers, and Amazon, too, has denied le-
gitimate infringement claims.156 Additionally, when Mindy reached 
out to third-party sellers, she never received a response.157 As a re-
sult, counterfeits destroy products’ quality, making it impossible for 
small businesses to address.158 
There are also incredible financial burdens as a result of current 
law. A common way to show specific instances of infringement is 
 
149 See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010). 
150 Id. 
151 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, supra note 38. 
152 See Bercovici, supra note 7. 
153 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, supra note 38. 
154 See Andrew Lehrer, Tiffany v. Ebay: Its Impact and Implications on the Doctrines of 
Secondary Trademark and Copyright Infringement, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 373, 398–
99 (2012). 
155 See Buyer Beware, supra note 35 (statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public 
Citizen’s Global Trade Watch). 
156 See Zavertailo, supra note 1. 
157 Id. 
158 See Product Counterfeiting, supra note 34, at 25. 
2021] DESIGNING DUPES 1323 
 
through test buys, where a seller buys a product to test the quality.159 
However, this action can cost a significant amount of money if there 
are multiple listings and sellers, especially for small businesses.160 
Tiffany alone spent $14 million in anti-counterfeiting efforts.161 As 
a result of these financial burdens, some brands are turning to block-
chain technology to certify the authenticity of their products.162 
Brands have even instituted intellectual property task forces in their 
fight against counterfeiters, involving collaboration between major 
online marketplaces and well-known brands.163 Changes should be 
made as many of these efforts could prove to be difficult, or even 
impossible, for small businesses.  
Online marketplaces are feeling the effects of the counterfeit 
problem. For instance, in 2019, Nike pulled its products from Ama-
zon after its short stint as a wholesaler to combat Nike fakes on the 
platform.164 The successful activewear company was unable to 
maintain control because when Amazon removed counterfeit list-
ings, more would appear under a different name.165 Brands, such as 
Nike, attempt these preventative measures due to the Tiffany ruling, 
taking an “if you can’t beat them, join them” approach.166 As a 
 
159 See David Streitfeld, What Happens After Amazon’s Domination Is Complete? Its 
Bookstore Offers Clues, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/06/23/technology/amazon-domination-bookstore-books.html [https://perma.cc/7A 
QN-CQUK]. 
160 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, supra note 38, at 19. 
161 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
162 See Matteo Montecchi et al., It’s Real, Trust Me! Establishing Supply Chain 
Provenance Using Blockchain, 62 BUS. HORIZONS 283, 289, 291 (2019); see also Alice 
Newbold, Louis Vuitton To Launch First Blockchain To Help Authenticate Luxury Goods, 
VOGUE UK (May 17, 2019), www.vogue.co.uk/article/lvmh-blockchain 
[https://perma.cc/Y3MQ-GNWG] (describing how LVMH plans to use blockchain 
technology to prevent counterfeits). 
163 See Press Release, Kering, Kering and Alibaba Group Agree to Cooperate in 
Protection of Intellectual Property and Joint Enforcement (Aug. 3, 2017), available at 
https://www.kering.com/en/news/alibaba-group-agree-cooperate-in-protection-
intellectual-property-joint-enforcement [https://perma.cc/QX6R-WTHC] (noting that 
Kering agreed to dismiss the lawsuit against Alibaba). 
164 See Eben Novy-Williams & Spencer Soper, Nike Pulling Its Products from Amazon 
in E-Commerce Pivot, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2019-11-13/nike-will-end-its-pilot-project-selling-products-on-amazon-site 
[https://perma.cc/HK2L-SWRA]. 
165 See id. 
166 See Lehrer, supra note 154, at 395. 
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result, some online marketplaces are increasing their anti-counter-
feiting efforts.167 
B. Internal Regulating Systems Failure to Mitigate the Counterfeit 
Problem 
The counterfeit problem is akin to a tale of David and Goliath. 
Online marketplaces claim because they are not selling the counter-
feit goods and are merely providing consumers access to the goods, 
they are not responsible for false representations on their plat-
forms.168 However, they continue to facilitate the distribution of 
counterfeit products. For example, after Amazon heavily recruited 
Chinese sellers, its China team reported concerns of an increase in 
counterfeits, fraud, and unsafe products on its platform.169 Listing 
on well-known online marketplaces, such as Amazon, could deceive 
consumers as it gives these goods a presumption of legitimacy.170 
Amazon also provides low cost means for counterfeiters to avoid 
research and development costs, and takes care of shipping logistics 
for third-party sellers.171 Additionally, counterfeiters may upload 
pictures of the real product, use fake reviews, and include other mis-
leading information intended to deceive consumers.172 In Brush 
Hero’s case,173 Kevin opted for his products to be commingled in 
Amazon’s fulfillment centers.174 Comingling means if an item is 
listed as the same product but is a counterfeit from a different seller 
located in a warehouse closer to the customer, Amazon may un-
knowingly send the counterfeit item so the consumer can receive the 
product faster.175 
 
167 See infra Section II.B. 
168 See supra note 35. 
169 See Jon Emont, Amazon’s Heavy Recruitment of Chinese Sellers Puts Consumers at 
Risk, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-heavy-
recruitment-of-chinese-sellers-puts-consumers-at-risk-11573489075 
[https://perma.cc/7DJP-9Q69]. 
170 See Sloane et al., supra note 85, at 1210. 
171 See id. at 1211. 
172 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, supra note 38, at 22.  
173 See supra Introduction. 
174 See Bercovici, supra note 7. 
175 See id. 
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To combat the counterfeit problem, Amazon launched pro-
grams, such as Project Zero and its brand registry. Project Zero is an 
anti-counterfeiting system providing three tools: automated protec-
tions, self-service counterfeit removal, and product serialization.176 
Its brand registry is an enrollment program used to help rightshold-
ers protect their brand.177 The downfall of these programs is that 
none of their efforts seem to be stopping the sale of counterfeits, 
leaving the burden to find the dupes on the rightsholder.178 Amazon 
even engaged in joint lawsuits with brands against its users who are 
selling fake items.179 As a response to increasing pressure to resolve 
its counterfeit problem, the platform established a Counterfeit 
Crimes Unit to pursue civil litigation and criminal prosecution 
against counterfeiters, collaborate with brands in investigations, and 
help law enforcement.180 Although Amazon’s anti-counterfeiting ef-
fort is a significant improvement, the effort does not completely 
solve the problem; it fails to require sellers to use accurate and 
 
176 See Dharmesh M. Mehta, Amazon Project Zero, AMAZON (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/amazon-project-zero 
[https://perma.cc/A97P-3QVJ]. 
177 See Build and Protect Your Brand, AMAZON, https://brandservices.amazon.com 
[https://perma.cc/67QC-SP9G]. 
178 See Angela He et al., Amazon’s Anti-Counterfeit Efforts Fall Short, LAW 360 (Sept. 
11, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1307710/amazon-s-anti-counterfeit-efforts-
fall-short [https://perma.cc/CDK7-UUFU]. 
179 Since legislation aimed at online marketplaces put e-commerce giants on notice, 
Amazon has pursued litigation against its third-party sellers, teaming up with brands such 
as Valentino, Ferragamo, and YETI. See, e.g., Hannah Albarazi, Amazon Launches TM 
Blitz Against Card Game Counterfeiters, LAW 360 (Feb. 10, 2021), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1354155/amazon-launches-tm-blitz-against-card-game-
counterfeiters [https://perma.cc/N39A-VMSU]; see, e.g., Craig Clough, Amazon, 
Ferragamo Squeeze Alleged Belt Counterfeiters, LAW 360 (Feb. 12, 2021), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1354795/amazon-ferragamo-squeeze-alleged-belt-
counterfeiters [https://perma.cc/9V48-8RB6]; see, e.g., Isabella Jibilian, Amazon and YETI 
Sue Third-Party Sellers, Alleging They Sold Counterfeit Tumblers, as the Retail Giant 
Cracks Down on Fake Goods, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-yeti-lawsuit-allege-counterfeit-fake-tumblers-
sue-mugs-2020-12 [https://perma.cc/9VE5-SYWW]. 
180 See Press Release, Bus. Wire, Amazon Establishes Counterfeit Crimes Unit to Bring 
Counterfeiters to Justice (June 24, 2020), available at https://press.aboutamazon.com/ 
news-releases/news-release-details/amazon-establishes-counterfeit-crimes-unit-bring-
counterfeiters [https://perma.cc/3FDH-T74K] [hereinafter Amazon Counterfeit Crimes 
Unit]. 
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authorized images, transparent processes to prevent repeat offend-
ers, and comprehensive takedown policies.181 
In addition to Amazon’s efforts, anti-counterfeiting programs on 
online marketplaces have been inadequate for small businesses. 
Most marketplaces have not taken the same measures as Amazon, 
as the majority only provide policies against counterfeits on their 
websites.182 Although eBay has its VeRO program, which allows 
rightsholders to report eBay listings for infringement,183 the plat-
form nevertheless maintains a self-policing model.184 On other mar-
ketplaces such as Walmart, brand owners must separately request 
information from the seller after submitting their infringement re-
port.185 Further, small businesses do not have access to some of the 
anti-counterfeiting measures offered by online marketplaces. For in-
stance, eBay launched its Authenticity Guarantee program in 2020, 
which only provided post-sale authentication for watches valued 
over $2,000 and sneakers valued over $100.186 Small businesses, 
such as MinMac, Brush Hero, and Fuse Chicken,187 would be unable 
 
181 See He et al., supra note 178.  
182 See, e.g., Counterfeit Item Policy, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/help/ 
policies/prohibited-restricted-items/counterfeit-item-policy? [https://perma.cc/WWX8-
9SEM]; Prohibited Items Policy, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/legal/prohibited/ 
[https://perma.cc/8XGQ-ALZC]; Marketplace Prohibited Product Policy, WALMART, 
https://www.walmart.com/help/article/marketplace-prohibited-products-
policy/94d99d15c54049e19c5c0192facafadb [https://perma.cc/A24B-9GFF]; Intell. Prop. 
and Brand Protection Policy, WISH.COM, https://merchant.wish.com/intellectual-
property#ip-counterfeit [https://perma.cc/SR9C-VPZA]. 
183 Verified Rights Owner Program, EBAY, https://pages.ebay.com/seller-center/listing-
and-marketing/verified-rights-owner-program.html [https://perma.cc/2SKJ-TZL9]. 
184 Scott Pilutik, eBay’s Secondary Trademark Liability Problem and Its VeRO Program, 




185 See He et al., supra note 178. 
186 See eBay News Team, eBay To Authenticate Sneakers $100+ in U.S., EBAY (Oct. 12, 
2020), https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/news/ebay-to-authenticate-sneakers-100-in-u-s 
[https://perma.cc/4AUL-9LZ8]; see also Press Release, eBay, eBay Launches 
Authentication On All Watches Sold for $2,000 or More in the US with New Service, 
“Authenticity Guarantee” (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/news/ebay-
launches-authentication-on-all-watches-sold-for-2-000-or-more-in-the-us-with-new-
service-authenticity-guarantee/ [https://perma.cc/7EAV-Y3Q6]. 
187 Supra Introduction. 
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to apply not only because they do not sell sneakers or watches, but 
also because their products do not meet the price threshold.188 
Therefore, although these programs provide some aid, many busi-
nesses remain out of luck. 
C. Similar Conflicts in Copyright Law 
Some proponents believe trademark law should mirror the Dig-
ital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).189 Trademark legislation 
to address the counterfeit problem has been an important point of 
discussion.190 Even though there are similarities between copyright 
and trademark law, this Note rejects the proposal that contributory 
trademark liability should mirror the DMCA. However, in highlight-
ing the similarities in copyright legislation, this Section will demon-
strate why copyright law should merely inspire trademark law in-
stead of implementing a parallel imitation. 
In the Committee Report for the DMCA, Senator Patrick Leahy 
remarked that there must be “copyright laws [to] protect the intel-
lectual property rights of creative works available online in ways 
that promote the use of the Internet, both by content providers and 
users.”191 Thus the DMCA’s purpose was to facilitate development 
in the digital age192 and tackle the controversial issue of secondary 
liability, such as contributory infringement.193 Section 512 of the 
 
188 See generally MinMac Printable Wall Decor, ETSY, 
https://www.etsy.com/shop/MinMac [https://perma.cc/W2JH-QWRL]; see also generally 
Shop, BRUSH HERO, https://brushhero.com/collections/all [https://perma.cc/N88D-BEZB]; 
FUSE CHICKEN, https://www.fusechicken.com [https://perma.cc/27CM-2EKM]. Mindy 
sold her necklaces for approximately $15 to $18. Fuse Chicken products cost 
approximately $20 to $40. Brush Hero’s detailing brush costs approximately $50. 
189 Lehrer, supra note 154, at 399; Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from 
the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. 
Ebay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 940 (2005). 
190 See Sunderji, supra note 189, at 940; see also generally INTA Steps Up Efforts to 
Combat Counterfeits, New Laws Under Consideration, INTA (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.inta.org/inta-steps-up-efforts-to-combat-counterfeits-new-laws-under-
consideration/ [https://perma.cc/VL4L-792R]; AAFA, supra note 22. 
191 S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 65 (1998), available at https://www.congress.gov/ 
105/crpt/srpt190/CRPT-105srpt190.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GPC-5X8V]. 
192 Id. at 1–2. 
193 Id. at 40; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17 21–22 (2020), available 
at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9N4P-U99N] [hereinafter SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17] (stating that 
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DMCA provides online service providers (“OSPs”)194 four safe har-
bors when they work with copyright owners to take down infringing 
content.195 OSPs must “adopt and reasonably implement” a policy 
for the termination of “subscribers and account holders . . . who are 
repeat infringers.”196 However, as currently interpreted, an unwrit-
ten policy is in compliance with this requirement.197 OSPs must also 
“maintain a ‘notice-and-takedown’ process whereby the OSP re-
sponds expeditiously to remove or disable access” to the infringing 
material.198 In creating this process, Congress intended to provide 
incentives for OSPs and copyright owners to “address online in-
fringement cooperatively and efficiently” while encouraging the In-
ternet’s development.199 
In 2020, the Copyright Office reported its concerns about the 
Section 512 safe harbors and concluded the balance intended by 
Congress was askew.200 The Copyright Office also concluded sig-
nificant problems remain despite technological advancements, mil-
lions of takedown notices, the ineffectiveness of these notices, and 
the scope of online copyright infringement.201 At the Senate Judici-
ary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property on Section 512 of the 
DMCA, Chairman Tillis remarked the notice-and-takedown system 
allowed piracy to run rampant and has been ineffective, calling for 
a new system.202 
 
because OSPs provide the means rather than the content, OSPs are more likely to have 
secondary liability claims against them). 
194 S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 40. The Copyright Office recognizes that online service 
providers and internet service providers are used interchangeably, but in their report 
differentiates. Id. The Office refers to ISPs as mere conduit service providers under section 
512(a) and uses OSPs to refer to all online service providers, including mere conduits. Id. 
Essentially, an ISP provides web access whereas an OSP can be a website, email services, 
or network services. Id.  
195 Id. at 8. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 3. 
198 Id. at 9. 
199 Id. 
200 See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 197. 
201 Id. 
202 Committee on the Judiciary, Is the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown System Working 
in the 21st Century?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 29:38, 30:48–32:15 (June 2, 2020) (statement of Thom Tillis, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at 
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Proponents suggest Congress enact legislation parallel to the 
DMCA safe harbor provision because there are similar justifica-
tions, such as encouraging the Internet’s development, creating in-
centives for cooperation between rightsholders and online entities, 
and offering guidance for infringement liability.203 However, alt-
hough Section 512 has fairly specific eligibility requirements,204 it 
is still ineffective in its takedown process, repeat infringer policy, 
and its knowledge requirements highlighted below.205 Thus, legisla-
tion addressing contributory liability of online marketplaces should 
be inspired by the DMCA but should also go farther. 
1. The DMCA’s Takedown Process 
The DMCA mandates a copyright owner include the following 
in their takedown notice: the signature of the complaining party, the 
identification of the copyrighted work and infringing material, the 
complaining party’s contact information, and statements that the 
complaining party is acting in good faith, the notice’s information is 
accurate, and the party has authorization to act.206 The Copyright 
Office suggested a regulatory process regarding the minimum notice 
standards for takedown notices to protect the statute against chang-
ing communication methods.207 The Copyright Office also stated 
rightsholders found the notice-and-takedown system burdensome, 
highlighting the financial and time-consuming demands.208 As there 
is no exact timeframe for notice-and-takedowns,209 the Copyright 
Office noted it supports either a flexible statutory standard or a reg-
ulatory framework to complement existing judicial time ranges.210 
Similar to the conclusion the Copyright Office draws, the lack of a 
regulatory framework—or even specific requirements for its 




203 See Sunderji, supra note 189, at 940–41. 
204 See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 8 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)–(d)). 
205 See infra Section II.C.1, Section II.C.2, Section II.C.3. 
206  See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 25–26. 
207 See id. at 5. 
208 Id. at 137. 
209 See id. at 160. 
210 Id. at 162. 
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to have counterfeit goods removed by online marketplaces. How-
ever, legislation needs to go beyond what the DMCA provides to 
ensure a more efficient process. 
2. The DMCA’s Repeat Infringer Policy 
Additionally, the Copyright Office stated having a clear, docu-
mented, and public repeat infringer policy is an appropriate mini-
mum requirement and deterrent to infringement than unwritten pol-
icies.211 Current legislation does not specify a clear repeat infringer 
policy, nor does it require online platforms to make termination pro-
cedures publicly available.212 Comparatively to the suggestions in 
the DMCA report, online marketplaces may employ unwritten poli-
cies to meet minimum requirements. This possibility would create 
even more burdens for rightsholders. However, there must be more 
than minimum requirements and deterrence, such as what the Cop-
yright Office suggests, to address rightsholders’ concerns. 
3. The DMCA and Tiffany’s Knowledge Requirements 
Lastly, the Copyright Office looked into the tension between ac-
tual knowledge and red flag knowledge.213 Respectively, Section 
512 of the DMCA requires OSPs lack actual knowledge of infring-
ing material and lack awareness of facts or circumstances where in-
fringing material is apparent.214 The Copyright Office suggested 
Congress clarify these two requirements, where such knowledge re-
quirements would benefit from a reasonableness standard.215 The re-
port also suggested Congress clarify the intended scope of willful 
blindness.216 Similar to willful blindness in Tiffany, OSPs that inten-
tionally blind itself from knowledge of infringing activity satisfy the 
actual knowledge requirement and loses its safe harbor.217 
 
211 Id. at 3. 
212 The SHOP SAFE Act only specifies that the platform must terminate sellers that have 
sold counterfeits on more than three instances. See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), 
available at https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
213 See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 3. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 4. 
217 Id. 
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Legislation regarding contributory liability for online market-
places should address Tiffany’s knowledge requirement. Courts are 
not new to interpreting existing law and adding heightened stand-
ards into statutes when they are not explicitly addressed. For exam-
ple, Congress codified the willful infringement standard in 35 
U.S.C. § 298 when it enacted the 2012 American Invents Act 
(“AIA”).218 Courts have changed this standard over the years by first 
applying a two-prong “objectively reckless” standard,219 to declin-
ing an imposition of an affirmative obligation to obtain outside 
counsel,220 only later to agree the opinion of counsel may be rele-
vant.221 The latest discussion from courts for determining willful-
ness is changing the standard from a question of law to de novo re-
view.222 If new legislation does not address the Tiffany knowledge 
standard, there is a chance courts may react similarly for contribu-
tory trademark liability by determining a knowledge requirement is 
necessary. As a result, rightsholders would be unable to meet the 
heightened standards. 
4. Copyright Reform in 2021 
Although anti-counterfeiting reform is of significant im-
portance, it should not track some future copyright reform pro-
posals. The pandemic relief and government spending bill (the “Om-
nibus Bill”) 223 established a quasi-judicial tribunal with three “Cop-
yright Claims Officers.”224 The law empowers the Board to hear 
copyright infringement claims, misrepresentation of takedown no-
tices, and related counterclaims and defenses for cases not 
 
218 Bryan J. Cannon, The Travesty of Patent Opinion Use: Advancing the AIA to Fix the 
Misguided Patent Infringement Enhanced Damages Framework, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
439, 445, 454 n.129 (2015) (“This was not only a holding of In re Seagate, it was recently 
codified in the America Invents Act.”). 
219 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halo 
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
220 Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
221 Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
222 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 776 F.3d 837, 841 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923.  
223 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, H.R. 113, 116th Cong. (2020), available at 
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-116HR133SA-RCP-
116-68.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z2L-3HXQ]. 
224 Id. at Div. Q § 212, 78–79, 88. Also known as the CASE Act. Id.  
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exceeding $30,000 in the aggregate.225 Critics are concerned this 
new law will provide larger companies the opportunity to pursue 
damages against Internet users.226 There is also a concern the law 
facilitates abuse by “copyright trolls,” may silence free speech, and 
may be ineffective because of the opt-out option.227 
Copyright law is also experiencing reform on the DMCA front. 
U.S. Senator Thom Tillis released a discussion draft for moderniz-
ing copyright law, also known as the Digital Copyright Act of 
2021.228 The draft includes revisions to the safe harbor provisions, 
such as establishing best practices for OSPs, lowering the specificity 
of the knowledge requirements, and replacing the notice and 
takedown system with a notice-and-stay-down system.229 
Responding to arguments calling for trademark reform to mimic 
copyright reform, the results may be alarming. The concern the Om-
nibus Bill may facilitate abuse by “copyright trolls”230 is already 
present on online marketplaces. By taking advantage of online mar-
ketplaces’ anti-counterfeiting systems, counterfeiters report legiti-
mate listings and take over the market share once the online market-
place deactivates the legitimate account.231 Therefore, to address 
such concerns, a parallel amendment to trademark liability would 
not resolve the problem. 
Additionally, anti-counterfeiting reform should not track copy-
right reform, specifically Senator Tillis’ discussion draft requiring 
 
225 Id. at 84–85, 93–94. With respect to registered works, parties may receive up to 
$15,000 in damages. See id at 93. With respect to unregistered works, parties may receive 
up to $15,000 in damages. See id at 94. 
226 Jaci L. Overmann & Emily O. Douglass, Intell. Property Measures Included in 




228 See generally Digital Copyright Act of 2021 (Discussion Draft Dec. 18, 2020), 
available at https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/97A73ED6-EBDF-4206-ADEB-
6A745015C14B [https://perma.cc/7UDC-6K77]. 
229 Press Release, Thom Tillis, Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/ 
12/tillis-releases-landmark-discussion-draft-to-reform-the-digital-millennium-copyright-
act [https://perma.cc/XQ5B-GUMN]. 
230 Overmann & Douglass, supra note 226, at 2. 
231 See Bercovici, supra note 7, at 17–18. 
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users who upload content to hold the copyright to the content.232 If 
anti-counterfeiting legislation proposes users hold the trademark, 
this requirement may not stop counterfeiters from claiming they are 
reselling legitimate items.233 Although mimicking copyright reform 
is not a step in the right direction, copyright reform should inspire 
anti-counterfeiting legislation to address Tiffany and its impact on 
rightsholders. 
D. Foreign Law: How France and Italy Tackle the Counterfeit 
Problem 
Liability for online marketplaces in foreign law should serve as 
inspiration for future legislation. The French Intellectual Property 
Code defines counterfeit broadly: any counterfeit is an offense.234 
By defining counterfeit broadly, French law suggests there is far-
reaching liability for online marketplaces. French law also criminal-
izes defendants if convicted of buying counterfeit goods, facing up 
to three years in prison.235 Although this Note does not suggest crim-
inalizing counterfeit buyers, it does propose more robust sugges-
tions to hold online marketplaces contributorily liable because of the 
counterfeit problem and Tiffany’s effect.236 
French courts are not afraid to hold online marketplaces liable. 
In France, LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (“LVMH”) and 
eBay had a long-standing legal battle over counterfeits and 
 
232 See Digital Copyright Act of 2021 (Discussion Draft Dec. 18, 2020), at 3. 
233 Currently, users can resell items but there has been recent litigation surrounding 
whether there is trademark dilution for the resale of legitimate products on online 
marketplaces. See Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-CV-07548-EDL, 
2019 WL 7810815, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2019) (ruling that Amazon’s motion to dismiss 
is denied). 
234 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, art. 335-2 (Fr.) (“Any edition of writings, 
musical composition, drawing, painting or any other production, printed or engraved in 
whole or in part, in defiance of the laws and regulations relating to the property of authors, 
is an infringement; and any counterfeit is an offense.”); Dianna Michelle Martínez, 
Fashionably Late: Why the United States Should Copy France and Italy to Reduce 
Counterfeiting, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 509, 524 (2014). 
235 See Sam Cocks, Note, The Hoods Who Move the Goods: An Examination of the 
Booming International Trade in Counterfeit Luxury Goods and an Assessment of the 
American Efforts to Curtail its Proliferation, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 501, 507 (2007). 
236 See infra Part III. 
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infringement.237 In 2008, a French Court ruled in favor of LVMH 
and ordered eBay to pay 38.5 million euros, which is approximately 
$52.1 million, to compensate LVMH for selling counterfeit and in-
fringing products.238 A French appeals court affirmed the judgment, 
but reduced the sum to 5.7 million euros.239 Even though LVMH 
employs investigators to find counterfeit products, the court went in 
the opposite direction of Tiffany by agreeing with the luxury brand 
that responsibility for policing their platforms should fall on 
eBay.240 The court noted eBay could not merely operate as an inter-
net service provider or a computer program where buyers act inde-
pendently, comparing the responsibility of an online marketplace to 
the responsibility of an auction house for the goods it sells.241 
In contrast to Tiffany, the French court went further by adding 
restrictions for the online marketplace. These restrictions included 
requiring resellers to register with the commerce and trade ministry, 
provide receipts of purchase or certificates of authenticity upon re-
quest, and be subject to monitoring to ensure the sale of only legiti-
mate goods.242 The court also suggested eBay notify consumers 
whenever a listing appeared suspicious.243 The ruling confirmed the 
importance of ensuring authentication and quality of products for 
consumers and clarified the rules to prevent illicit selling prac-
tices,244 which the Tiffany ruling failed to do. The decision also 
 
237 See Martinne Geller, LVMH and eBay Settle Litigation over Fake Goods, REUTERS 
(July 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lvmh-ebay-settlement/lvmh-and-ebay-
settle-litigation-over-fake-goods-idUSKBN0FM15G20140717 [https://perma.cc/P48G-
P457]. 
238 See id. 
239    Id. 
240 See Doreen Carvajal, Court Sides with LVMH over eBay, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/technology/30iht-lvmh.4.14109529.html 
[https://perma.cc/44N5-58F8] (“eBay bears responsibility for filtering the system and 
demanding assurances of authenticity.”). 
241 See Angelo Bufalino and Christopher Moreno, Internet Merchants Owe a Greater 
Duty of Care to Their European Clients - Louis Vuitton v. eBay [France] in Contrast See 
Tiffany v. eBay [NY, US], THE NAT’L L. REV (Sept. 5, 2010), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/internet-merchants-owe-greater-duty-care-to-their-
european-clients-louis-vuitton-v-ebay-fran [https://perma.cc/2UVX-RAXE]. 
242 See id. 
243 See id. 
244 See Press Release, LVMH, LVMH/eBay—The Paris Court of Appeal Confirms 
eBay’s Liability (Sept. 3, 2010), available at https://www.lvmh.com/news-
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prohibited eBay from engaging in future direct or indirect violations 
of selective distribution245 and forbade the online marketplace from 
selling LVMH brand perfumes in the future.246 In 2012, an appeals 
court affirmed the judgment but limited the application to French 
and British courts.247 Both companies have settled their case by im-
plementing cooperative measures.248 
In a different case, a French court also held eBay liable for in-
fringement in the sale of counterfeit Hermès bags, echoing a deci-
sion which eliminated a copyright infringement liability defense for 
e-commerce companies.249 Contrary to the U.S. and the Tiffany rul-
ing, the main takeaway is that France is more supportive of 
rightsholders; it cracks down on counterfeiting and pushes to hold 
online marketplaces accountable for facilitating counterfeiting.250 
Italian law is also tough on preventing and penalizing counterfeit 
activity. Italy is one country most affected by global counterfeiting, 
directly after the United States and France.251 Intellectual property 
is a significant part of Italy’s economy, and almost every industry 
either produces or uses it.252 Trademark industries alone contribute 




245 See id. 
246 See Jonathan Thrope, French Court Orders eBay to Pay Luxury Goods Giant $63 
Million, AM. L. DAILY (July 1, 2008), https://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 
2008/06/french-court-or.html [https://perma.cc/5F4R-VYDH]. 
247 See Geller, supra note 237. 
248 See id. 
249 See Rick Mitchell, French Court Rules eBay Liable for Sales of Counterfeit Hermès 
Bags, BLOOMBERG L. (July 27, 2010), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/french-
court-rules-ebay-liable-for-sales-of-counterfeit-hermes-bags [https://perma.cc/QY7H-
YTF2]. 
250 See, e.g., Romain Dillet, French Administration Suspects Wish of Selling Counterfeit 
Products, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 30, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/30/french-
administration-suspects-wish-of-selling-counterfeit-products [https://perma.cc/M8FW-
6324]. 
251 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE IN 
COUNTERFEIT GOODS AND THE ITALIAN ECONOMY 16 (2018), 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/trade-in-counterfeit-goods-and-the-italian-economy-
updated-december-2018-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEX7-TY6P]. 
252 See id. 
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percent of total employment.253 Comparatively to the response to-
wards Tiffany, Italy responded to counterfeits increasing presence 
with robust anti-counterfeiting measures. For example, the Istituto 
di Centromarca per Iotta alla contraffazione (“INDICAM”) acts as 
a middleman between the law and different industries, presenting 
itself as an expert body on counterfeits.254 Italy also has an antitrust 
authority, which previously shut down websites selling counterfeit 
items.255 
Italy’s code penalizes both consumers and sellers of counterfeit 
goods.256 In enacting Decree-Law No. 80 of 14 May 2005, Italy has 
implemented a fine up to 10,000 euro to anyone who purchases or 
receives an item without vetting its origin, when the price or other 
factors leads the customer to believe there has been intellectual 
property infringement.257 After this decree, Italy’s Supreme Crimi-
nal Court ruled—under Articles 473 and 474 of the Criminal 
Code—trademark infringement includes post-sale confusion.258 
Italian courts have also held internet service providers liable if they 
 
253 Id. 
254 See INDICAM, http://www.indicam.it/wp-content/uploads/2018_INDICAM_ 
Company-Profile_ENG-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYZ4-ABDH] (“INDICAM works as a 
connection point between industry and law, presenting itself in front of institutions, 
enforcement, companies or consumers as a privileged observatory on all the topics 
concerning brands.”). 
255 Press Release, AGCM, Made in Italy: The Antitrust Authority, in Collaboration With 
the Special Market Protection Unit of the Guardia di Finanza (Italian Tax Police) Shuts 
Down 15 Websites Selling Counterfeit Products Branded Tod’s and Roger Vivier (June 
17, 2013), https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2013/6/alias-2069 [https://perma.cc/ 
F7GX-RN66]; see also Reuters Staff, Italian Police Block 410 Websites Selling High-
Fashion Fakes, REUTERS (June 19, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-
counterfeit-idUSKBN0OZ14E20150619 [https://perma.cc/5LR9-7HRM ]. 
256 Codice Penale [C.p.] [Penal Code] art. 474 (It.), available at 
http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=36768 [https://perma.cc/U9ZY-2E7L]; 
Martínez, supra note 234 (“Article 474 of the Italian Criminal Code provides that anyone 
who introduces counterfeit goods into Italy shall be punished with imprisonment for one 
to four years, and face a fine ranging from 3,500 to 35,000 euro.”). 
257 Martínez, supra note 234, at 528 (citing Decreto legge 14 maggio 2005, n. 80/05, art. 
1(7), G.U. 2005, n. 111 (It.), available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05080l.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MDC4-Y7WW]). 
258 Cesare Galli, Procedures and Strategies for Anti-Counterfeiting: Italy, WORLD 
TRADEMARK REV. (May 14, 2019), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-
counterfeiting/procedures-and-strategies-anti-counterfeiting-italy-1 
[https://perma.cc/7TFH-2KYX]. 
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were “aware of the presence of suspicious material” and did not take 
measures to remove it,259 but it is unclear if there is an exception to 
online marketplaces. However, in cracking down on the counterfeit 
industry, Italian law suggests there is little burden on the 
rightsholder, which has not been the case in Tiffany.  Additionally, 
Italian law has teeth in its targeted approach to both the supply and 
demand of counterfeiting.260 
Although France and Italy appear to be rightsholder-friendly, 
their laws could become even more favorable to brands due to Eu-
rope’s Digital Markets Act (the “DMA”) and Digital Services Act 
(the “DSA”), proposed in December 2020.261 The DMA establishes 
criteria for determining whether an online platform is a gatekeeper 
and provides obligations for the gatekeepers.262 The DSA also im-
poses obligations for entities, such as intermediary services, hosting 
services, and online platforms,263 including online marketplaces.264 
One of its missions is to provide greater democratic control and 
oversight of platforms for society at large.265 Contrary to Tiffany, 
both Acts aim to boost digital competition and protect individuals 
from harm, and ensure other players are not prevented from compet-
ing.266 The Acts also solidify France and Italy’s anti-counterfeiting 
measures by imposing fines for large online platforms that fail to 
 
259 Id. 
260 See Martínez, supra note 234, at 529–30. 
261 See generally EU Digital Services Act Set to Bring in New Rules for Tech Giants, 
BBC (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55307115 
[https://perma.cc/26PA-P9PQ]. 








264 The Digital Services Act Package, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/digital-services-act-package [https://perma.cc/GVH2-77FZ]. 
265 See The Digital Services Act, supra note 263. 
266 Laura Kayali & Thibault Larger, 5 Challenges to the New EU Digital Rulebook, 
POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/5-challenges-to-the-new-eu-
digital-rulebook [https://perma.cc/GG6U-33WJ]. Both Acts have not passed at the time of 
writing this Note. Id.  
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limit illegal material, including counterfeit goods.267 As a result, 
online marketplaces will have to appoint independent auditors to en-
sure compliance with the new rules,268 suggesting responsibility will 
not fall on rightsholders. 
E. The SHOP SAFE Act 
Recognizing the counterfeit problem, a bipartisan group pro-
posed the “Stopping Harmful Offers on Platforms by Screening 
Against Fakes in E-Commerce Act of 2020,” better known as the 
SHOP SAFE Act.269 With the change in elected officials, Congress 
archived the SHOP SAFE Act.270 However, given two of the bill’s 
representatives remain in the House271 and that legislators recognize 
the significant counterfeit problem, Congress members may intro-
duce similar legislation. Because the SHOP SAFE Act presented a 
significant milestone in proposed anti-counterfeiting legislation, this 
Note aims to improve upon its legacy for future legislation. 
The SHOP SAFE Act amended the Lanham Act to provide con-
tributory liability for e-commerce platforms for the use of counter-
feit marks by a third-party seller on their platforms.272 The House 
Committee on the Judiciary recognized consumers should trust what 
they see—namely what they purchase online is what they will re-
ceive.273 Therefore, the Act aimed to tackle the gaps in e-commerce 
 
267 Mark Scott et al., Tech Giants to Face Large Fines Under Europe’s New Content 
Rules, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/tech-giants-to-face-large-
fines-under-europes-new-content-rules [https://perma.cc/VC2W-URFH]. 
268 Id. 
269 See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. 1 (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
270 See H.R. 6058 (116th): SHOP SAFE Act of 2020, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr6058 [https://perma.cc/7BJC-RRD4]. 
271 See Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://www.house.gov/representatives [https://perma.cc/ZNJ3-RCB3]. Representatives 
Nadler and Johnson of Georgia remain in the House of Representatives. Id. 
272 H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. 1 (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
273 Press Release, House Committee on the Judiciary, Nadler, Collins, Johnson & Roby 
Introduce Bipartisan SHOP SAFE Act to Protect Consumers and Businesses from the Sale 
of Dangerous Counterfeit Products Online (Mar. 2, 2020), 
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systems to stop counterfeit sales.274 However, the SHOP SAFE Act 
did not seek to alter Tiffany’s stance on direct liability for trademark 
infringement on online platforms.275 
The Act was intended to impose liability for online marketplaces 
if a third-party sells counterfeit products which pose a risk to con-
sumer health and safety.276 It defined “goods that implicate health 
and safety” as “goods the use of which can lead to illness, disease, 
injury, serious adverse event, allergic reaction, or death if produced 
without compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local 
health and safety regulations and industry-designated testing, safety, 
quality, certification, manufacturing, packaging, and labeling stand-
ards.”277 
Further, the Act imposed contributory liability for infringing 
online platforms, unless they take actions to satisfy ten best prac-
tices,278 forming a safe harbor. The safe harbor requirements require 
the seller (1) verify the seller’s identity, location, and contact infor-
mation;279 (2) verify and attest the goods are not counterfeit;280 (3) 
agree to not sell counterfeits and consent to being sued in the United 
States court system;281 (4) display the seller’s identity, location, and 
contact information, as well as where the goods are made and where 
the goods will be shipped from;282 (5) use images that accurately 
depict the goods and ensure the seller “owns or has permission to 
use” such depictions;283 (6) use technology to screen for counter-





275 See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. 6 (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
276 Id. at 2. 
277 Id. at 6. 
278 Id. at 2. 
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280 Id. at 3. 
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282 Id. at 3–4. 
283 Id. at 4. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
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sellers who have listed or sold counterfeit goods three times;286 (9) 
screen sellers to prevent terminated sellers from creating new ac-
counts on the platform;287 and (10) share an infringing seller’s infor-
mation with law-enforcement and, upon request, the owner of the 
registered trademark.288 
 
III. BETTER AND STRONGER: ARGUMENTS FOR MORE ROBUST ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING MEASURES 
It is virtually impossible for small businesses to protect them-
selves from counterfeiting; thus, government intervention is neces-
sary.289 Online marketplaces have further exacerbated the issue.290 
This Part argues the proposed anti-counterfeiting legislation, the 
SHOP SAFE Act, should be revised based on the lessons from the 
DMCA report and foreign law. Section III.A highlights the prob-
lems with the SHOP SAFE Act by examining its limitations on the 
availability of recourse and how it amplifies the inefficiencies of 
Tiffany. Section III.B proposes three areas where legislators should 
focus on improving the SHOP SAFE Act.291 Finally, Section III.C 
discusses how courts should broadly interpret limiting language in 
legislation. 
A. A Brand’s Perspective: The SHOP SAFE Act’s Impact on 
Rightsholders 
Activists have called on Congress to address liability of online 
marketplaces for counterfeit sales.292 Significant anti-counterfeiting 
initiatives taken by Amazon, for example, attempt to get ahead of 
anti-counterfeiting legislation.293 However, these efforts ignore 
 
286 Id. at 4–5. 
287 Id. at 5. 
288 Id. 
289 See Product Counterfeiting, supra note 34, at 25. 
290 See supra Section II.I.B. 
291 Although this Section argues for amendment on these three areas, future bills 
addressing contributory liability for online marketplaces should consider these suggestions 
in their text. 
292 See generally AAFA, supra note 22. 
293 See He et al., supra note 178. “Amazon’s rollout of new initiatives is likely a 
calculated effort to control the narrative ahead of the potential legislative mandates.” Id.  
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more demanding measures, such as preventing repeat infringers.294 
Despite online marketplaces’ attempts at mitigating counterfeit 
goods on their platforms, more needs to be done. Thus, this Section 
illustrates how the SHOP SAFE Act limits the availability of re-
course and is inefficient for rightsholders by adding a safe harbor. 
1. The SHOP SAFE Act Limits the Availability of Recourse 
for Rightsholders 
The SHOP SAFE Act limits itself to goods that implicate health 
and safety.295 Accordingly, the Act’s language suggests online mar-
ketplaces can avoid liability if the goods do not involve health and 
safety. For small business owners, like Mindy,296 this limitation 
means seeing their hard work counterfeited on the virtual shelves of 
virtual stores and not having viable options of recourse. A savvy 
investigator may be able to find and police counterfeits online, but 
not always. Often, rightsholders are unaware counterfeiters use their 
name, similar to Brush Hero and Fuse Chicken’s case.297 Only re-
cently have online marketplaces increased their pursuit of removing 
counterfeit listings on their platforms. However, these marketplaces 
do not have an incentive to do better because current domestic law 
weighs in their favor,298 and courts will most likely apply Tiffany if 
a rightsholder brings a lawsuit.299 Thus, it is an injustice for the 
SHOP SAFE Act to have such limiting language, leaving rightshold-
ers with very little recourse available. 
In the plight of brands and retailers against online marketplaces 
and their third-party sellers, Tiffany’s knowledge requirement 
proves to be an obstacle. However, it is unclear if courts will imple-
ment a knowledge requirement because the SHOP SAFE Act does 
not explicitly address it.300 If courts implement a knowledge 
 
294 Id. 
295 See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
296 See supra Introduction. 
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298 See supra Section II.A and Section II.B. 
299 See generally Tre Milano, LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc., No. B234753, 2012 WL 
3594380, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012). 
300 See supra Section II.C.3. 
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requirement, rightsholders would be unable to alleviate the costs of 
monitoring and performing test buys. In light of these considera-
tions, the availability of recourse for rightsholders remains limited. 
2. The SHOP SAFE Act is Inefficient for Rightsholders 
The takedown and termination requirements in the SHOP SAFE 
Act are highly inefficient for rightsholders because there is not 
enough legislative guidance adequately shifting the burden to online 
marketplaces. First, the Act requires online marketplaces to imple-
ment a timely takedown program of counterfeit listings.301 However, 
the Act does not provide a regulatory framework for doing so and 
does not explicitly speak to the time range for the takedown. Alt-
hough the SHOP SAFE Act provides contributory liability to online 
marketplaces selling counterfeit goods that implicate health and 
safety, its takedown provision is completely lacking in any effi-
ciency to alleviate the burden on brands. For example, if numerous 
storefronts sell counterfeit versions of the legitimate goods across 
various online marketplaces, test buys become costly and time-con-
suming. Additionally, sellers on online marketplaces often use pic-
tures of the legitimate product for marketing,302 which causes prob-
lems for rightsholders to prove the item is a counterfeit. Even though 
there is litigation surrounding reselling on online marketplaces,303 
the process for removing counterfeit goods is frustrating. 
For small businesses, online marketplaces are not quick to jump 
to their aid.304 They may remove some listings, but many online 
marketplaces simply ignore these rightsholders.305 Even for major 
brands such as Tiffany, the burden is still on the brand to police 
counterfeits. By not providing a regulatory process or framework in 
 
301 See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. 4 (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
302 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT AND 
PIRATED GOODS 13 (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
20_0124_plcy_counterfeit-pirated-goods-report_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2XX-XZB8]. 
303 See Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-CV-07548-EDL, 2019 WL 
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the SHOP SAFE Act, online marketplaces may institute bare mini-
mum changes to the systems they have in place now. 
The SHOP SAFE Act also poorly addresses repeat infringers. In 
its termination requirement, the Act requires online marketplaces to 
terminate sellers who engage in more than three instances of using 
a counterfeit mark.306 Although “more than three instances” is a spe-
cific threshold, there remains a high potential for confusion. For ex-
ample, “three instances” could indicate the number of times a seller 
engages in counterfeit activity or the number of listings using a 
counterfeit mark. 
The termination requirement is also vague as it does not address 
whether “seller” refers to criminal networks or the storefronts them-
selves. The lack of clarification can alter the liability for online mar-
ketplaces. As a result, a vague definition of “seller” may allow these 
online platforms to avoid liability as the SHOP SAFE Act may not 
apply to third-party sellers engaging in sophisticated counterfeit op-
erations. When looking at other legislation relating to online mar-
ketplaces, ‘seller’ is defined more precisely.307 Thus, the absence of 
an explicit definition presents an issue of inefficiency for rightshold-
ers. 
Although the SHOP SAFE Act requires sellers to be verified and 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction,308 this requirement will not stop the 
sellers if the termination requirement is not clarified. As discussed, 
counterfeit sellers are often outside of U.S. jurisdiction,309 and 
 
306 See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. 4–5 (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
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foreign markets frequently make counterfeit goods.310 An online 
marketplace may satisfy the verification requirement by including a 
little check box, but this check box provides no strong deterrent. 
Further, in cases where the counterfeit seller operates outside of the 
U.S., the courts may likely dismiss these cases for lack of jurisdic-
tion. However, if online marketplaces attempt to exclude foreign 
sellers, there could be a significant controversy of discrimination. 
Lastly, counterfeit sellers can circumvent termination using a virtual 
private network (“VPN”) to set their location to the U.S., even if 
they do not do business or reside there. Once terminated, counterfeit 
sellers may repeatedly create new virtual storefronts311 with new 
names or VPNs. Considering these concerns, the lack of guidance 
for how online marketplaces satisfy the termination requirement 
presents a problem. 
B. Amending Anti-Counterfeiting Legislation 
Regulations imposed on online marketplaces in combating 
counterfeit goods should improve rather than limit the options and 
efficiencies for rightsholders. Consumers purchasing goods they be-
lieve are legitimate should not be subject to the ongoing tensions 
between online marketplaces and rightsholders. On the other hand, 
rightsholders are limited in their capacity to ensure consumers are 
purchasing their legitimate goods. This Section presents several ar-
eas where Congress should bear in mind when crafting anti-coun-
terfeiting legislation. 
1. Widen the Scope of Liability for Online Marketplaces to 
Cover More than “Goods That Implicate Health and 
Safety” 
Congress should remove language limiting liability to goods that 
implicate health and safety as the Act—as currently written—does 
not address Tiffany. Although it may impose liability for the most 
dangerous counterfeit items, online marketplaces can still avoid lia-
bility. The benefit of removing such language broadens liability, 
 
310 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 12. 
311 See Ballard & Sinatra, supra note 16. 
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allowing small businesses, such as MinMac, Fuse Chicken, or Brush 
Hero,312 to pursue legal accountability of online platforms. 
In addition to removing the limiting language, the SHOP SAFE 
Act should consider clarifying the general knowledge standard 
courts apply through the Inwood test. The clarification should read, 
“online marketplaces shall be contributorily liable if they were 
aware of the infringing counterfeits and failed to remove it.” This 
clarification aligns with Italian law as it relates to the country’s 
stance on service providers.313 A potential drawback would be an 
unsavory judicial interpretation of “awareness,” seemingly bringing 
us back to square one, along with the potential for courts to heighten 
this standard. However, the SHOP SAFE Act should specify the 
goal is to lower the general knowledge standard established by Tif-
fany. In this situation, courts are put on notice when determining 
whether there is contributory trademark liability. This proposal is 
also in line with the Copyright Office’s suggestion of clarifying the 
DMCA’s actual knowledge and red flag knowledge requirement and 
Senator Tillis’ discussion draft for modernizing copyright law in 
lowering the knowledge standard.314 When the SHOP SAFE Act in-
cludes a clear knowledge standard, the explicit clarification puts par-
ties on notice and aids efficiency for rightsholders and the judicial 
system. Here, courts and parties will know the applicable standard. 
Drawing from the Copyright Office’s suggestion of clarifying 
the DMCA’s willful blindness standard, Congress should specify 
where willful blindness is enough to meet the knowledge require-
ment. The clarification should read, “willful blindness applies where 
the online marketplace intentionally shielded itself from finding 
counterfeit activity even where the platform was generally aware of 
such activity.” Tiffany reasoned that willful blindness may trigger 
Inwood, but generally knowing counterfeit activity is on the plat-
form is not enough for legal liability.315 Without explicit clarifica-
tion, courts may look to Tiffany and rule in favor of a higher bar for 
willful blindness. This revision shifts the burden to the online 
 
312 Supra Introduction. 
313 See supra Section II.D. 
314 See supra Section II.C.3 and Section II.C.4. 
315 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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marketplace to actively police for counterfeits by removing the 
shield of general awareness. Thus, if these online platforms do not 
want to be liable for contributory trademark infringement, such clar-
ification encourages online marketplaces to ensure counterfeit 
goods are not sold on their platforms. 
In widening the scope of the SHOP SAFE Act, Congress should 
include a provision, “any online marketplace that introduces coun-
terfeit goods into the United States shall be liable for contributory 
trademark infringement.” Drawing on the French eBay cases,316 
such provision will be a victory for rightsholders and consumer pro-
tections in online shopping, as the change in language reaches out-
side the scope of “goods that implicate health and safety.” However, 
the provision may employ more stringent implications on importing 
goods into the country, which means there is a potential for imported 
goods to be heavily searched for counterfeits, creating inefficiency 
in the trade importation process.317 If Congress specifies it is the 
online marketplaces’ responsibility to ensure goods sold on the plat-
form are legitimate goods before the goods are sold and shipped, 
this provision’s legislative purpose could remedy the trade effi-
ciency concern. Therefore, this proposal may alleviate the burden 
on the rightsholder. 
In widening liability, the SHOP SAFE Act should also forbid 
online marketplaces from selling the prevailing party’s products if 
found contributorily liable. This proposal aligns with French law re-
stricting eBay from selling LVMH perfumes318 and gives online 
marketplaces an incentive to be more diligent in removing counter-
feit sellers and listings. 
2. Implement a Regulatory Process for Takedowns 
New anti-counterfeiting legislation should include a regulatory 
process for takedowns. Although the DMCA imposes requirements 
for its notice-and-takedown system,319 an effective list for Congress 
 
316 See supra Section II.D. 
317 Seizures of counterfeit goods have increased in past years. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., supra note  38, at 8. 
318 Thrope, supra note 246. 
319 See supra Section II.C.1. 
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to require of online marketplaces would be to obtain the (1) identi-
fication of the legitimate trademark, (2) the identification of the in-
fringing listing, (3) the shipping address of the infringing listing, (4) 
a statement the complaining party is acting in good faith, and (5) a 
statement the notice is accurate. Although these obligations are sim-
ilar to the obligations found in the SHOP SAFE Act, as the Act is 
currently written, online marketplaces may shove these similar re-
quirements onto rightsholders. In fact, online marketplaces already 
shift this burden to rightsholders.320 Therefore, these requirements 
must be taken by the online platforms themselves, especially since 
they can obtain the information easily than the legitimate owner. 
The benefit of including the identification of the legitimate 
trademark and infringing listing provisions is to facilitate simple 
comparisons. Although some counterfeit sellers use pictures of the 
legitimate product in their listings,321 some may not. In the latter 
scenario, the online marketplace can obtain identification of the le-
gitimate trademark and the infringing listing to show the listing po-
tentially engages in counterfeit activity. Obtaining identification al-
lows for an expeditated process to remove the counterfeit listings. A 
potential drawback would be in determining if a listing is using le-
gitimate images. The SHOP SAFE Act compels online marketplaces 
to require sellers to use images that accurately depict the actual 
goods.322 This requirement is not only vague, but it is not attached 
to the takedown process and does not address sellers who may be 
disguising themselves as a reseller. If the images are the same, the 
shipping address of the infringing listing may indicate whether the 
item is likely to be a counterfeit item. As discussed, if an item is 
shipped from China, there may be a higher likelihood the item is a 
counterfeit.323 However, there is the question of whether relying on 
the shipping address excludes legitimate goods coming from foreign 
countries. As a response, Congress should specify this provision 
 
320 See supra Section II.B. 
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merely acts as a layer of security to conclude whether the items are 
likely counterfeit. 
Lastly, obtaining a statement of good faith and a statement the 
notice is accurate acts as a deterrent for bad actors who may want to 
take a listing down with no legitimate belief the listing is of their 
counterfeit item. It is not likely an issue for Congress to include such 
provisions since the French courts suggest online marketplaces have 
a civil responsibility for the goods sold on its platform.324 By includ-
ing such provisions in legislation, Congress can adequately resolve 
the inefficiencies of the takedown requirement. 
The SHOP SAFE Act should also reject the imposition of test 
buys on the complaining party. Including such a provision—that ex-
plicitly states this rejection—benefits the rightsholder by alleviating 
financial burdens. However, there should be some verification the 
item is a counterfeit. Therefore, the SHOP SAFE Act should encour-
age online marketplaces to provide a buyback program targeting dis-
gruntled customers who believe they have received a counterfeit 
item. When the online marketplace receives the alleged counterfeit 
item, they can compare it to the authentic item and remove the list-
ing and seller under an explicit and reasonable statutory period, such 
as forty-eight hours. 
3. Clarify the Termination Requirement 
The SHOP SAFE Act includes a termination requirement that 
the online marketplace must terminate sellers who have listed or 
sold counterfeit goods three times.325 Similar to the DMCA report 
on repeat infringer policies,326 anti-counterfeiting laws would bene-
fit from legislative guidance on compliance with this requirement. 
As discussed, three times is ambiguous, and it is simply too many 
instances. Suppose a counterfeit seller sells multiple counterfeit 
items from one listing, has numerous counterfeit listings in its store, 
or has multiple storefronts with counterfeit items. In this case, the 
damage is done by the time the online marketplace finds three in-
stances of counterfeit selling. Therefore, legislation, such as the 
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SHOP SAFE Act, should require a strict one-time infringement pol-
icy applying to the onset of the first counterfeit sale by a storefront. 
Legislation should also require online marketplaces to implement a 
tracking system to flag suspicious activity in detecting the first coun-
terfeit sale. A one-time infringement policy signals to counterfeit 
sellers that the online marketplace will not tolerate the sale of coun-
terfeit goods. It also safeguards rightsholders from constantly send-
ing notices to the online marketplace to terminate the seller or the 
listing. 
Though there is an issue of how online marketplaces would 
know when counterfeit selling is occurring and thus when to stop 
the sales after the first instance, the SHOP SAFE Act should require 
online marketplaces to implement tracking systems. These tracking 
systems will ensure new sellers are not repeat infringers by using 
current technologies to flag when suspicious activity is afoot. This 
flag should trigger human review and further investigation by the 
online marketplace. By including this provision in the termination 
requirement, the burden on rightsholders likely decreases and en-
sures counterfeit goods are not sold on the platform multiple times 
by the same users. Requiring an online marketplace to implement a 
tracking system further encourages efficiency for rightsholders. It 
also complements the SHOP SAFE Act’s requirement to use tech-
nology to screen for counterfeits before the goods appear on the plat-
form.327 
A potential drawback concerns individuals’ right to privacy: a 
balancing act between data collection and consent. However, if a 
seller wants to sell products on an online marketplace, legislation 
should require marketplaces obtain consent from the seller. In ob-
taining consent, the SHOP SAFE Act should require platforms in-
clude a provision in their terms of service and give notice to third-
party sellers when they set up their virtual storefronts. Legislation 
should also require online marketplaces to notify sellers that the 
platform employs tracking technology to ensure sellers are not en-
gaging in counterfeit operations. 
 
327 See H.R. 6058 H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. 4 (2d Sess. 2020), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK]. 
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On the other hand, online marketplaces may argue anti-counter-
feiting legislation will cause them to lose their business to foreign 
online marketplaces with more lenient rules. However, legislation, 
such as the SHOP SAFE Act, should explicitly state these measures 
apply to any and all e-commerce websites with third-party sellers 
who sell to U.S. consumers. Therefore, it will be unlikely online 
marketplaces, such as Amazon and eBay, will lose their market 
share to foreign online platforms. 
The SHOP SAFE Act should also expand the definition of 
“sellers” who are subject to removal. General requirements, such as 
the SHOP SAFE Act’s termination requirement, leave room for 
online marketplaces to implement their processes, which has been 
inefficient for rightsholders.328 Thus, the SHOP SAFE Act should 
change its language surrounding third-party sellers and expand it to 
include persons or organizations engaging in counterfeit sales. The 
termination requirement will then be more robust and will also ad-
dress criminal networks. Additionally, Congress should require 
online marketplaces terminate sellers operating multiple storefronts 
if found to be selling counterfeit goods. This expansion takes the 
pressure from rightsholders to find and police third-party sellers and 
places pressure on marketplaces to ensure counterfeit goods do not 
plague their platforms. 
Lastly, the SHOP SAFE Act’s termination requirement needs a 
strong deterrent. In France, the court ruled against eBay, forbidding 
the online marketplace from selling LVMH perfumes,329 arguably 
acting as a deterrent. Mimicking this ruling, the SHOP SAFE Act 
should include a provision in the termination requirement requiring 
online marketplaces to implement arbitration agreements. These ar-
bitration agreements would apply to third-party sellers found selling 
counterfeit goods. Drawing on Europe’s proposals in the DMA and 
the DSA,330 the Act should require online marketplaces to impose 
fines if third-party sellers are found liable through arbitration. Fur-
ther, inspired by the French LVMH case, the SHOP SAFE Act 
should require if the third-party is liable, they will no longer be able 
 
328 See supra Section II.B. 
329 Thrope, supra note 246. 
330 See supra Section II.D. 
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to sell through the online platform. Although this proposal may not 
deter all counterfeit sellers, it should deter a significant portion of 
them. 
C. Court Interpretation of Goods that Implicate Health and Safety 
If Congress passes anti-counterfeiting legislation limited to 
goods that implicate health and safety, the last Hail Mary is how a 
court interprets which goods implicate health and safety. Some 
products may fall under goods implicating health and safety if they 
have indirect adverse effects on individuals, such as workplace haz-
ards or hazardous chemicals on the items. Counterfeit goods are 
made in unsafe and unsanitary conditions, have ties to criminal or-
ganizations, and damage the economy,331  indirectly impacting 
health and safety. 
In determining if a counterfeit implicates health and safety, 
courts should look towards the conditions of the good’s source. For 
example, because counterfeit items are not usually made in safe con-
ditions,332 workers are put at significant risk when making counter-
feit products. Additionally, because counterfeit items are manufac-
tured in toxic conditions, those toxins can find themselves into or 
onto the counterfeit product in some form.333 Thus, there are impli-
cations of health and safety simply due to the factories or locations 
of these operations. 
Courts may also consider the individuals behind the counterfeit 
goods in determining whether they implicate health and safety. For 
criminal organizations, the money these networks make from selling 
counterfeit goods goes to illicit activities such as drug trafficking 
and terrorism.334 These illicit activities could impact health and 
safety, especially if criminal organizations’ networks extend into the 
U.S. Lastly, courts should take into consideration the damage to the 
economy. Because the sale of counterfeit goods is partially respon-
sible for unemployment,335 the economy’s health is also affected. 
 
331 See supra Section I.A.2. 
332 Counterfeits and Their Impact on Consumer Health And Safety, supra note 63. 
333 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 16–18. 
334 See JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 61, at 42. 
335 See supra Section I.A.2; see also FRONTIER ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 5. 
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This proposal may be an overextension of the judicial system, 
but it is worth arguing because many rightsholders do not have other 
options to hold online marketplaces contributorily liable. Looking 
at indirect impacts on health and safety presents some hope, albeit 
in an extremely narrow way. If anti-counterfeiting laws do not ad-
dress the full scope of problems associated with Tiffany, rightshold-
ers who want to pursue legal action should consider this avenue. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The United States’ attempt at fighting the battle of counterfeiting 
on online marketplaces has been lackluster, but there is hope for 
anti-counterfeiting legislation. Although understandably health and 
safety come first for American lives, there remain serious financial 
and reputational harms Congress should address. In regard to online 
marketplaces, safe harbors are inefficient, and Congress should con-
sider new legislation that holds online marketplaces contributorily 
liable and mitigates harms in addition to those implicating health 
and safety. With the Internet continuously growing, more forms of 
online marketplaces are becoming available, such as on social media 
platforms like Facebook and Instagram. As mentioned, social media 
becomes a hotbed for counterfeiters to target consumers,336 which 
further increases the agency for anti-counterfeiting legislation. 
Until legislation can mitigate most—if not all—negative im-
pacts, rightsholders may need to look towards other technologies. 
Such measures include the use of blockchain technology or special-
ized codes on products to ensure resale items are authentic. What is 
clear is the proposal detailed in this Note regarding the prevalent 
dupes on online marketplaces is reasonable to protect rightsholders 
and consumers from the harms of the counterfeit industry. 
 
336 See supra Section I.A.2. 
